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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how loss aversion affects people's behavior in
civil litigation. We find that a loss-averse plaintiff demands a higher offer for
small claims to maintain her threat to proceed to trial compared to a loss-
neutral plaintiff. For larger claims, a loss-averse plaintiff demands a lower offer
to increase the settlement probability as loss pains her extra in trial. We also
investigate how various policies affect loss-averse litigants' settlement decisions.
Only a reduction in the asymmetry of information about trial odds uniformly
leads to higher settlement rates.
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1 Introduction
Private litigation is one of the most important aspects of a modern legal system. In
(the 12-month period ending in) 2016, about 20.3 million new civil cases were filed
in State courts in the US, to which one must add 274,555 new civil cases filed in US
district courts.1However, most cases do not go to trial: they are dropped, resolved by
motions, or settled in some way. Data on US State courts show that over 96 percent
of civil cases do not go to trial (Ostrom, Kauder, and LaFountain, 2001). Similarly,
data on federal courts demonstrate that, for fiscal year 2016, almost 99 percent of
civil cases were resolved without trial.2 Still, in this and other jurisdictions, given
the high costs associated with the judicial system, public authorities actively try
to encourage alternative modes of dispute resolution, other than trial.3 Fostering
settlements is typically part of such a strategy, but it requires understanding how
parties to a dispute behave in the first place.
1. Data for State courts are taken from the State Court Caseload 2016, produced by the National
Center for State Courts. See <http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/National-
Overview-2016/SCCD_2016.ashx> (consulted on September 3, 2018). Data for US courts are taken from
the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, 2016, produced by the Administrative Office of the US Courts.
See <http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_jci_0331.2016.pdf>(consulted on Sep-
tember 3, 2018). For State courts, cases classified as having either a civil or a domestic relations nature
were both taken up.
2. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, 2016, produced by the Administrative Office of the US Courts.
See <http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c4_0331.2016.pdf> (consulted on
September 3, 2018).
3. For instance, the US Department of Justice has set up an Office of Dispute Resolution whose mission
is to promote the effective use of alternative modes of dispute resolution throughout the Department but
also in litigation.
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There is a large literature on the behavior of private litigants but it takes for
granted that litigants behave as rational expected utility maximizers (and, more
often than not, as expected wealth maximizers). The economic theories of litigation
started with Landes (1971) and Gould (1973) that focused on the divergence in
expectations about trial outcomes between the plaintiff and the defendant.4 Sub-
sequently, scholars started to use asymmetric information to model litigation and
settlement behavior. In a typical tort litigation setting, the plaintiff may indeed
have private information about the damages she has suffered while the defendant
may have private information about his liability for the accident. Ramseyer and
Nakazato (1989), Farber and White (1991), Osborne(1999), Waldfogel (1998) and
Sieg (2000) all provide empirical evidence for the existence and the importance of
asymmetric information in various litigation environments. P'ng (1983) and Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1986) use a signaling model where the informed party moves
first by making a settlement offer. Bebchuk (1984) adopted a screening set-up where
the uninformed party makes a settlement offer to the informed one. That model is
particularly adapted to the case where a one-time victim sues a repeated or well-
informed defendant.5 The main prediction of that model, that cases reaching trial
should disproportionately be made up of cases favorable to the defendant, is borne
out in many contexts.6 However, some of the predictions of that model, for instance,
the ones related to legal fee-shifting, are not consistent with the empirical evidence
(see section 4 for further discussion).
One problem we see is that the decision-theoretic foundations of existing models
are traditional. They do not acknowledge some of the well-established regularities
that led the profession to question the empirical relevance of standard expected
utility maximization, such as loss aversion. Starting with Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), numerous studies have established
that decision makers evaluate options based on gains and losses in comparison with
a reference point. The evaluation is asymmetric: losses loom larger than same-sized
gains. Loss aversion is observed in many real-world contexts, as well as laboratory or
field experiments. It has proven to be a powerful explaining tool. For instance, com-
bining loss aversion and myopia, Benatzi and Thaler (1993) provided an explanation
to the equity premium puzzle. Camerer et al. (1997) used loss aversion to make sense
of cab drivers' decisions on their daily working hours. Genesove and Mayer (2001)
found that it explained the behavior of sellers on the housing market in Boston in
the 1990s. Several studies (Thaler 1980, Knetsch and Sinden 1984, and Thaler and
Johnson 1990) used loss aversion to explain the fact that people place higher value on
objects which they already have compared to those they do not have (the endowment
effect). Loss aversion also helps explain the sunk cost fallacy and the escalation of
commitment (Arkes and Bloomer 1985). It has an important impact on legal theories
as well. For example, Zamir and Ritov (2010) used loss aversion to explain the
popularity of contingent-fee arrangements with lawyers, which cost their clients two
4. See also Posner (1973), Shavell (1982) and Vasserman and Yildiz (2019).
5. Spier (1992) extended the framework of Bebchuk (1984) by allowing multiple periods of bargaining
to explain the "U-shaped" time pattern of settlement. Schweizer (1989), Spier (1994) and Klerman et
al.(2018) explored litigation games with two-sided asymmetric information.
6. For the case of medical malpractice in the US, see the review by Peters (2009), which shows that
cases with objective evidence of negligent or deficient care are more likely to settle.
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or three times more than an hourly-rate or fixed-amount arrangement. Wistrich and
Rachlinski (2012) found that loss aversion and the sunk-cost fallacy led experienced
lawyers to prolong litigation, which hurts their clients. In this paper, we study how
loss aversion affects litigants' choices about settlement in private litigation.
Given how pervasive loss aversion is, it is important to understand how litigants'
behavior is affected by it. In this paper, we try to answer this question from a
theoretical perspective. Specifically, we are interested in how loss aversion affects
litigants' decisions such as filing a lawsuit and choosing a settlement offer. We show
that loss aversion significantly affects a plaintiff's decisions. In particular, contrary
to what first intuition may suggest, loss-averse plaintiffs are not uniformly likely to
settle more often, or for less, than loss-neutral litigants.
We base our model on Bebchuk's (1984): an uninformed plaintiff makes a settle-
ment offer to an informed defendant. The settlement offer has the screening function:
a defendant with a weaker case will accept the offer while a stronger defendant will
prefer trial. If the offer is rejected, we assume that the plaintiff can drop the suit
and save litigation costs. In this case, the plaintiff faces a credibility constraint:
her offer is credible only if she can maintain her threat to proceed to trial following
rejection (Nalebuff, 1987). Although it is intuitive that loss aversion makes for a
weaker plaintiff who settles for less, this only happens when the stake is high enough.
The need to remain credible induces a loss-averse plaintiff to ask for more when
stakes are low. The intuition for this result is as follows: a loss-averse plaintiff has
to further lower the offer amount to keep the credibility constraint satisfied because
trial brings more disutility to her than to a loss-neutral plaintiff.
We discuss changes to the environment or policy rules (level and allocation of
trial costs, underlying uncertainty, in-court settlement regime). As one would expect,
the effects on settlement rates and litigation costs differ depending on whether
the credibility constraint is binding or not. Only a reduction in the asymmetry
of information can uniformly lead to a decrease in trial costs.
Section 2 introduces our baseline model and the main results. Section 3 discusses
comparative statics regarding litigation costs and the distribution of the defendant's




In this section, we introduce our litigation model, featuring asymmetric information
and a loss-averse plaintiff. We assume that there are two players, the plaintiff and the
defendant. For convenience only, in what follows we take the plaintiff to be female
and the defendant male. The plaintiff sues the defendant for compensationW , which
is assumed to be fixed and commonly known to both players at the beginning of the
game.7 If they proceed to the trial stage, the plaintiff will pay fixed litigation costs
7. In practice, certainly in liability cases, the quantum of harm is not known with certainty and its
assessment is part of the dispute.
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Cp>0 and the defendant will pay Cd>0. Those represent the direct and opportunity
costs associated with introducing, supporting or defending a formal lawsuit. If the
two parties manage to work out a settlement before trial, they will save litigation
costs Cp and Cd. If the plaintiff does not drop the suit after settlement fails, trial
will follow. A more detailed description of the timing comes later in this section.
For the time being, we introduce the key assumptions of the model.
Asymmetric information In a civil dispute, the defendant often has more infor-
mation regarding the existence of liability (for instance, whether negligence could
be proven in court). We assumed the defendant to have private information about
the strength of his case. To be specific, he knows his probability of losing in court,
which is randomly and privately drawn at the beginning of the game and is denoted
by p 2 [0; 1]. The plaintiff, on the other hand, only knows the distribution of p,
represented by a p.d.f. f() and a corresponding c.d.f. F (). Based on this limited
information, she makes a unique settlement offer to the defendant.8
Loss-averse plaintiff The plaintiff's preferences are represented by a reference-
dependent utility function with loss aversion. We use Kahneman and Tversky's value
function of income w with respect to a fixed reference point, o:
u(w jo) =

w− o if w> o
(w− o) if w<o (1)
In the gain domain, the utility is the difference between the actual income w and
the reference income o. In the loss domain, the difference is multiplied by the loss
aversion coefficient,  ( > 1). This coefficient describes the importance of loss
aversion in the plaintiff's preferences: for =1, the plaintiff is a standard expected
utility maximizer; for  > 1, losses loom larger in her assessment of uncertain
prospects, and the more so, the higher . In what follows, we assume o to be
equal zero. That is, we assume that the reference point is the status quo prior to
starting litigation. It is assumed exogenous and constant during the litigation period.
Although the specification of an exogenous reference point is somewhat arbitrary as
part of a theoretical exercise, we note that the use of this reference point (as opposed
to, say, the situation before the faulty action taken by the defendant) is supported
by some experimental evidence (Zamir and Ritov, 2012).9
We assume that utility is linear in w. That is, we assume that the plaintiff is
risk-neutral in the gain and loss domains, respectively, and isolate the effects of loss
aversion. In practice, individuals are likely to exhibit both risk and loss aversion.
For simplicity, we circumvent the differences in risk attitudes and focus exclusively
on the fact that losses loom larger than gains. In the conclusion, we elaborate on
the changes which risk aversion would bring to our analysis.
8. One could of course consider the contract-theoretical case where the plaintiff attempts to screen
defendants by offering them to choose their preferred option in a menu of settlement amounts and con-
tinuation probabilities, so that they truthfully reveal their type. It is however hard to think of a situation
where the plaintiff could commit herself to proceed to trial with a given probability. On the contrary, we
believe that the plaintiff can always choose to drop the lawsuit after her offer has been rejected and that
is what we model.
9. If the plaintiff were basing her utility on the situation before the event that caused litigation, under
compensatory damages she would experience utility only in the loss domain (for, in the best case, she can
only hope to be fully compensated for the harm suffered) and loss aversion would therefore not play any role.
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Whether the defendant also exhibits loss aversion (which may be an empirical
issue if, for instance, it is a corporation or an insurance company in an individual
tort case) is immaterial to our analysis. Winning at trial, losing or accepting the
settlement offer, the defendant always finds himself in the loss domain. Every pay-
ment he makes would be multiplied by coefficient − in his utility function, so the
level of  does not matter for his decisions as long as it is non-zero.













plaintiff wins (p) defendant wins (1− p)
nature





the defendant's private information p is drawn from F
Figure 1. Timing of the litigation game
Compared to Bebchuk (1984), one noticeable feature of our game is the following:
if the settlement offer is rejected, then the plaintiff has the chance to drop the suit.
In that case, she does not have to pay litigation costs Cp but receives nothing from
the defendant. It means that in the pre-trial settlement phase of the game, she has
to look at the credibility of her implicit threat to actually proceed with trial in case
her settlement offer is rejected, a point first made by Nalebuff (1987).
We solve this game of incomplete information for perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Before going into the actual analysis, we survey the key decisions to be made by the
litigants, according to backward induction.
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Dropping the suit In stage 4, the plaintiff decides whether to drop the suit or not
given that her offer has been rejected. Depending on the amount of the rejected offer,
she updates her belief about the defendant's type p. Then, she makes her decision by
comparing the expected utility of trial (formally defined later) and that of dropping
the suit, which is assumed to be zero. For convenience, we assume that the plaintiff
will pursue the lawsuit if she is indifferent between dropping it and pursuing it.
Accepting the offer In stage 3, the defendant decides whether to accept the offer
or not. The decision will depend on whether a trial is likely to follow or not and, in
case it is, on the expected trial costs compared to those of accepting the settlement
offer.
Making an offer In stage 2, anticipating the defendant's acceptance/rejection
behavior and her own decisions regarding pursuing the lawsuit in case her offer is
rejected, the plaintiff chooses a settlement amount that maximizes her expected
utility. At this stage she faces a credibility constraint: an offer that is too generous
might be rejected only by the more serious defendant types, which would prevent
her from rationally continuing with litigation after rejection.
Bringing the lawsuit If the plaintiff always gets negative utility from trial, she
will drop the suit in stage 4. She thus gets zero utility from bringing the lawsuit
and is indifferent between bringing it and not. For convenience, we assume that she
will not bring the lawsuit in the first place. (It is also likely that in reality, merely
filing a lawsuit already comes at a cost.)
2.2 Formal Solution
In an equilibrium fL; S; r(S; p); br(S); dr(S)g, L 2 f0; 1g is the plaintiff's decision
about whether to bring the lawsuit or not. S is the equilibrium offer made by the
plaintiff. r(S; p) is the probability that a type p defendant rejects offer S, where
r 2 [0; 1]. br(S) [0; 1] characterizes the plaintiff's belief about the support of the
distribution of the defendant's types at trial and dr(S) 2 [0; 1] characterizes the
probability that the plaintiff dropping the suit if offer S is rejected. We start by
showing that an offer with dr(S)=1 (i.e. the plaintiff drops the suit with probability
1 following rejection) is always rejected in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if the plaintiff drops the suit for
sure after rejection of offer S (dr(S)=1), thenS is rejected with probability 1 by all
defendant types.
Proof. see the appendix. 
An immediate consequence is that, if an equilibrium involves such an offer on the
equilibrium path (dr(S) = 1), then the plaintiff's payoff from bringing the lawsuit
is zero. By assumption, the plaintiff then does not bring it. From now on, we focus
on equilibria where a lawsuit is introduced.
Next, we show that the defendant's equilibrium choice exhibits a cut-off property.
Lemma 2. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, for an offer S with dr(S)2 [0; 1), if
a type p~ defendant weakly prefers rejecting to accepting, then (i) p~ strictly prefers
rejecting S~>S and (ii) a defendant with p< p~ strictly prefers rejecting S to accepting
it.
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Proof. see the appendix. 
Notice that sequential rationality requires that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 hold for
equilibrium offer S as well as any other offer S off the equilibrium path. As we
assumed that the plaintiff pursues the trial when she is indifferent, we have either
dr(S) = 1 or dr(S) = 0 in any sub-game after the plaintiff makes her offer, denoted
by S.
One can restrict the range of the equilibrium offer S to [Cd; W + Cd] without
loss of generality. S = Cd is the highest offer that is accepted with probability 1
by all defendant types. In equilibrium any choice S<Cd is strictly dominated by
S = Cd because the latter brings the plaintiff more and is also accepted for sure.
S=W + Cd is the lowest offer rejected with probability 1 by all defendant types.
Any choice S>W +Cd leads to the same outcome as S=W +Cd.10
Furthermore, directly from Lemma 2, for an offer within the range [Cd;W +Cd]






For the defendant with type p, he will reject S for sure if p < p(S); if p> p(S), he
will accept S for sure. Moreover, we have p0(S)=1/W > 0: if the plaintiff increases
the offer amount, the probability of rejection will increase as defendants with weaker
cases will choose to reject.
From the plaintiff's perspective, the probability of trial is therefore F (p(S)) and
her expected utility is (with subscript p standing for plaintiff):




[pW −Cp− (− 1) (1− p)Cp]f(p)d p (3)
pW −Cp is the expected income from trial. Loss aversion introduces an asymmetry
between settlement and trial in the plaintiff's choice: settlement is a sure gain while
trial might lead to a loss (given the existence of trial costs). Faced with a type p
defendant, the plaintiff loses with probability (1− p) and the loss Cp is amplified by
loss aversion. The solution to the first-order condition, Sfoc, is given by:
1−F (p(Sfoc)) = f(p(Sfoc)) p0(Sfoc) (Cp+Cd)
+(− 1) f(p(Sfoc)) p0(Sfoc) (1− p(Sfoc))Cp (4)






+(− 1) (1− p(Sfoc)) Cp
W
(5)
The right-hand side of the first-order condition is decreasing in p(S). For it to
uniquely pin down an interior solution p(Sfoc) and thus Sfoc, we need the following
assumptions on the distribution of p:
10. Thus, if there are equilibria in which offer S* is rejected for sure and P drops the lawsuit, there
are also equilibria in which P makes an even higher offer, but all those equilibria are outcome-equivalent:
by our assumptions, the lawsuit is not introduced in the first place.
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1−F (p) is increasing in p;
3. The concavity of f(p)







) has a constant
sign for p2 [0; 1].
The first assumption guarantees that the marginal benefit of asking for more is high
enough at p(S)= 0, ruling out the corner solution S =Cd. Any distribution with a
thin left tail satisfies it. Along with the second assumption, which is the standard
monotone hazard rate property, it guarantees that an interior solution exists. The
third assumption is about the curvature of the hazard rate and guarantees unique-
ness. Log-concave distributions satisfy the second and the third assumptions, and
most (truncations of) common distributions exhibit the third property.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions A, the first-order condition (5) has a unique
solution in p(S) as well as in S.
Proof. see the appendix. 
In first-order condition (4), the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of further
increasing S. If the plaintiff increases the offer amount, she will extract more from
defendant types [p(S); 1]. If the offer is accepted, the plaintiff's payoff is marginally
increased by 1. The right-hand side denotes the marginal cost of increasing S. For
a marginally higher offer, the marginal defendant(with type p(S)), will shift from
accepting to rejecting. The plaintiff bears the full costs of this shift, which are the
litigation costs Cp+Cd multiplied by the intensity of the marginal shift. This trade-
off is well-known since Bebchuk (1984). The second term on the right-hand side is
new and results from loss aversion: against the marginal type p(S), the plaintiff's
losing probability is (1− p(S)), which costs her (− 1)Cp in addition.
The above only applies to credible offers with dr(S) = 0. For this condition to
hold, the trial stage utility must be non-negative. With the cut-off property of
defendant's rejection choice, the plaintiff's expected trial stage utility is defined as
below:
Up
trial(S) = E[pjp< p(S)]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E [pjp< p(S)])Cp
where E denotes the (conditional) mathematical expectation. Thus, the plaintiff's
objective in Stage 2 becomes11:
max
S
Up(S) s: t: Up
trial(S) 0
11. It means that in calculating plaintiff's utility of bringing the lawsuit, we assume that W is high
enough such that trial is profitable for the plaintiff against the average defendant. If Uptrial(S)< 0 for any
S, the plaintiff does not bring the lawsuit as we assumed.
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Up
trial(S) is the expected utility at trial stage. It is increasing in S over [Cd;W +Cd]:
when the plaintiff increases the offer amount, the expected winning probability
E[pjp< p(S)] becomes higher as the marginal type p(S) becomes higher. Demanding
more in the settlement, the plaintiff pushes weaker defendant types to trial, which
means that she faces a more favorable pool of defendants in court. Therefore, the
credibility constraint puts a lower bound on the settlement offer. The lower bound,
denoted by S







)]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E [pjp< p(S

)])Cp=0 (6)




2.3 Comparison with a traditional plaintiff
We now compare a loss-averse plaintiff's choices (S and dr(S)) with those of a loss-
neutral plaintiff (=1). We use subscript tp to denote such a `traditional plaintiff'.

















This is a similar constrained maximization problem: the plaintiff chooses a settle-
ment offer that maximizes her expected utility given that her trial stage utility is
non-negative if this offer is rejected. Similar to (5) and (6), we can solve for Stp
foc by
(50) and Stp by (60):
1−F (p(Stpfoc)) = f(p(Stpfoc)) p0(Stpfoc) (Cp+Cd) (50)
Utp
trial(Stp)=0 ) E [pjp< p(Stp)]W −Cp=0 (60)
The solution is:
Stp
 = max (Stp
foc; Stp) (70)
Comparing the settlement offers (S and Stp ) and the probabilities of trial (F (p(S))
and F (p(Stp )) ), we find that the result depends on the claim W . We have the
following proposition:






1. For small claims (Wtp6W <W

), a loss-averse plaintiff does not file a lawsuit
while a traditional plaintiff does.
2. For big claims (W >W~ ) 1) a loss-averse plaintiff demands a smaller settle-
ment; 2) the probability of trial is lower; 3) total expected litigation costs are
lower.
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3. For medium claims (W

6 W < W~ ), 1) a loss-averse plaintiff demands a
higher settlement offer to make her threat to litigate credible; 2) the probability
of trial is higher; 3) total expected litigation costs are higher.
Proof. see the appendix. 




Wtp is the minimum of compensation level which incentivizes the traditional plaintiff
to introduce the lawsuit. W

is the minimum of compensation level which incentivizes
the loss-averse plaintiff to introduce the lawsuit:
W

= (1+ (− 1) (1−E[p])) Cp
E[p]
:





It is the compensation level at which the loss-averse plaintiff and the traditional
plaintiff choose the same settlement offer. The existence and uniqueness of W~ is
established in the proof of Proposition 2 (see the appendix).
For the plaintiff there are two scenarios that affect her settlement offer. First,
the offer optimizes her expected utility at the moment that the offer is made. As
the plaintiff becomes (more) loss averse, the utility cost of losing in court becomes
higher. To avoid this increased utility cost, she reduces the offer amount to increase
the probability of acceptance. The second scenario is that after the settlement offer
is rejected, the plaintiff's expected utility from trial is negative. It is not credible for
her to proceed to trial and it implies that the offer is rejected by all defendant types.
Increasing the amount, her offer is rejected by defendant types who have higher
probability of losing in court, thus increasing the expected value from trial. For the
offer to be credible, the expected value must be at least zero. A (more) loss-averse
plaintiff counts the utility cost of losing in court more and needs a higher offer (i.e.
a weaker pool of defendants who reject) to maintain a credible threat to proceed
to trial. Depending on which scenario we are in, a (more) loss averse plaintiff can
make a higher or lower settlement offer. For intermediate damage claims we are in
the second scenario: it is optimal to file a lawsuit and the credibility constraint is
binding. For smaller damage claims, the plaintiff does not file the lawsuit. For higher
claims,the first scenario is more likely.
One might have thought that loss aversion makes for weaker plaintiffs who sue
less often and, when they do, always settle for less. We show in Proposition 2
that the need to remain credible induces loss-averse plaintiffs to ask for more than
loss-neutral plaintiffs when stakes are of medium size. That is because, under loss
aversion it becomes harder to settle intermediate claims than big claims and total
litigation costs go up in that case. An interesting, testable implication is that the
presence of loss aversion will shift the composition of lawsuits that proceed to trial
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away from small and large stakes, and towards intermediate stakes, diminishing the
variance of judgments.
2.4 A numerical example
The following figures give a numerical example of the probabilities of trial F (p(S))
(F (p(Stp ))), and settlement offers S(Stp ) under different claims W when p follows
a truncated normal distribution on [0; 1].12
Figure 2. Probabilities of trial for different plaintiffs (=2; Cp=4; Cd=2).
Figure 3. Settlement offers from different plaintiffs (=2; Cp=4; Cd=2)
12. The untruncated distribution has mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2. We use this distribution
for all following numerical examples unless specified otherwise.
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The results from Proposition 2 are clear from the figures. Wpe (Wtpf ) features
a kink in the S(W ) (Stp (W )) curve. For smaller W , the optimal settlement offer
is determined by the credibility constraint that trial stage utility should be non-
negative; for larger W , the optimal offer is determined by the first-order condition.
ForW

6W < W~ , the loss-averse plaintiff demands a higher settlement to make sure
that she will not drop the case if her offer is rejected. For W >W~ , the loss-averse
plaintiff demands a lower settlement offer to increase the probability of settlement.
Both results come from the fact that the loss-averse plaintiff suffers additional utility
loss when she loses in trial.
For W < Wtp, neither a traditional plaintiff nor a loss-averse plaintiff finds it
profitable to bring a lawsuit. ForWtp6W <W

, a traditional plaintiff brings a lawsuit
whereas a loss-averse plaintiff does not. Again, the intuition is that it is harder for
a loss-averse plaintiff to profitably go to trial: she endures additional utility loss if
she loses in trial compared to a traditional plaintiff. Thus, compensation W has to
be higher for the loss-averse plaintiff to bring a lawsuit.
3 Comparative statics
We now go over some of the comparative statics. We first examine what happens
when trial costs change before looking at the role of the underlying uncertainty about
the winner of a trial (distribution of p). Ultimately, we are interested in character-
izing the effects on litigation costs. From the point of view of economic welfare, there
is no reason for having a narrow concern for litigation costs as deterrence and prece-
dent-setting certainly have social value. However, given their high administrative
costs, judicial systems often try to foster alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
It is therefore of interest to look at litigation costs.
3.1 Litigation costs
3.1.1 Plaintiff's litigation costs Cp
When the credibility constraint is not binding, an increase in Cp leads to a lower
probability of trial. Higher Cp means larger losses, so the effect of loss aversion is
bigger. The plaintiff thus prefers a higher settlement probability to avoid the loss.
The net effect on total litigation costs is ambiguous.
When the credibility constraint is binding, an increase in Cp leads to a higher
probability of trial because the plaintiff has to further increase the offer amount to
keep her threat to proceed to trial credible. Thus, contrary to the standard model,
such an increase in the plaintiff's litigation costs might decrease the probability of
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settlement due to the credibility constraint. If Cp becomes too high for the plaintiff
to profit from litigation, the probability of trial drops to zero, as the lawsuit is simply
not introduced. The following figure gives an illustration:
Figure 4. The effect of higher Cp on trial probabilities and on litigation costs (the shift
is from Cp=2 to Cp=4, and other parameters are the same as before)
3.1.2 Defendant's litigation costs Cd
The effects of higher Cd also depend on W . When W is low and the credibility con-
straint is binding, Cd does not affect the plaintiff's choice of p(S). It is determined
by equation (6), Uptrial(S) = 0, and Cd plays no part in it. S increases as Cd does
just to keep p(S) unchanged and equation (6) satisfied.
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If W is high enough such that the credibility constraint is not binding, an increase
in Cd lowers p(S) as the marginal benefit of settlement becomes higher for the
plaintiff from first-order condition (5). It translates into a lower probability of trial.
However, when trial takes place, litigation costs are higher because Cd is higher.
The effects on S and total litigation costs are ambiguous.
The following figures give an illustration:
Figure 5. The effect of higher Cd on trial probabilities and on litigation costs (the shift
is from Cd=2 to Cd=4, and other parameters are the same as before)
3.2 Distribution of p
In this subsection, we modify the assumption that the support of p is [0;1]. Instead,
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we assume the support to be [p

; p] with p

> 0 and p< 1. We consider two distribu-
tional changes regarding p.
First, we consider a shift to distribution G() in support [p

+ "; p + "] with
g(x + ") = f(x) for x 2 [p

; p]. The new distribution G() first-order stochastically
dominates distribution F (), which means that the plaintiff unambiguously faces a
pool of weaker defendants.
Under the new distribution G(), the plaintiff's credibility constraint is less
restrictive as the overall winning probability is higher. It translates into a lower
settlement offer and a lower probability of trial. When the credibility constraint is
not binding, the loss-neutral plaintiff asks for a higher settlement offer but the prob-
ability of trial stays the same (first-order condition (50)). However, for the loss-averse
plaintiff, the probability of trial will increase under distribution G(). Intuitively,
as the the plaintiff's overall probability of losing is lower under G(), the effect of loss
aversion becomes smaller and, as a result, he chooses to bargain more aggressively.







3. p(Sfoc) increases by more than ";
4. W~ decreases.
Proof. see the appendix 
Thus, a loss-averse plaintiff sues for a wider range of claims, settles intermediate
claims more often, but settles high claims less often. So, again, the effect on litigation
costs depends on the size of the claim. The following figure gives an illustration:
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Figure 6. FOSD shift of distribution (=2; Cp=4; Cd=2)
The shift is from a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 and support [0.2,0.8]
to a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.7 and support [0.4,1]. The untruncated
distribution has standard deviation 0.2.
Second, we consider a mean-preserving truncation of F (). Formally, for F with
support [p





+ " and p0 < p such
that E[p] = E[pjp 2 [p

0; p0]]. (Such a p0 can always be found.) Take G~ to be the
truncation of F on [p

0; p0]. Then, G~ is a mean-preserving truncation of F and
second-order stochastically dominates F . Such a change captures a reduction in
the degree of information asymmetry between the two parties (leaving the average
odds unchanged). In practice, it means extreme cases are eliminated from the
distribution.
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3. p(Sfoc) decreases.
Proof. see the appendix 
This result is similar to the one in Bebchuk (1984): the effect on S is ambiguous
but the probability of trial is for sure lower. A mean-preserving truncation of the
distribution of p means that the plaintiff has more precise information about the
defendant's type. Therefore, a mutually beneficial settlement becomes more likely.
The following figure gives an illustration:
Figure 7. mean preserving truncation of distribution (=2; Cp=4; Cd=2)
The shift is from a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 and support [0,1] to
a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 and support [0.1,0.9]. The untruncated
distribution has standard deviation 0.2.
4 Extensions: fostering settlements
Imagine again that society considers total trial costs to be of concern. What can it
do to reduce the volume and costs of trials? Procedural rules about the allocation of
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trial costs or other ways to foster settlements have been extensively discussed in the
literature. In our model, what happens when some of those rules are implemented?
4.1 Fee-shifting rules
In the baseline model, we assumed that the court enforced the so-called American
rule in the allocation of litigation costs: each party pays for their own legal expenses
regardless of the trial outcome. Now, we consider the English rule, which provides
that the loser in court pays for both parties' litigation costs. It is equivalent to
moving to an environment with WEN = W + Cp + Cd, CpEN = Cp + Cd and
Cd
EN =0 under the American rule. In practice, the English rule amounts to raising
the stakes for the plaintiff both on the income and the cost sides. Fee-shifting has
been extensively studied, theoretically, experimentally and econometrically.13
For intermediate claims where the credibility constraint is binding, shifting to
the English rule has ambiguous effects. In the American rule, W

, the lowest com-
pensation that incentivizes the plaintiff to sue is:
W

= [1+ (− 1)(1−E[p])] Cp
E[p]











EN depends on , Cp, Cd as well as the unconditional
expectation of p.
If the credibility constraint is not binding, the likelihood of settlement is lower
under the English rule if the plaintiff is not loss-averse (Bebchuk 1984). With loss
aversion, the fee-shifting may have ambiguous effects: if the level of loss-aversion
is high for the plaintiff, then the English rule may encourage settlement. From the





















For =1, fee-shifting unambiguously decreases the right side of equation (5). From
the increasing hazard rate property, p(Sfoc) increases as a result, leading to a lower
settlement rates. For equation (5EN), the right-hand side might become smaller if
 and Cd are large. Intuitively, if the heavy cost is shifted to the plaintiff and the
effect of loss aversion is large, then the plaintiff might prefer settling with a higher
probability. The following figure illustrates such a possibility:
13. See Kritzer (2001), Spier (2007) or Helmers et al. (2019) for reviews of the literature.
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Figure 8. probabilities of trial under different rules (=2; Cp=4; Cd=2)
Obviously, the net effect on the total number of trials will depend on the distri-
bution of W . However, a decrease in the number of trials is possible. This finding is
important, because some of the available experimental or empirical evidence about
the impact of fee-shifting (Anderson and Rowe, 1995; Hugues and Snyder, 1995;
Kritzer, 2001, Helmers et al., 2019) reports an increase in settlement rates upon the
adoption of the English rule, which our model rationalizes, contrary to Bebchuck's
(1984).
4.2 An in-court settlement regime
From Proposition 2, we can see that the plaintiff's binding credibility constraint
leads to a higher offer amount and thus higher probabilities of trial for medium-range
claims. The constraint results from the plaintiff's lack of commitment power. If the
plaintiff could credibly commit to trial in case her offer is rejected, then she as well as
the defendant would benefit: she would be able to make a lower settlement offer that
suits herself better. To achieve this, one may think of moving from the out-of-court
settlement regime which we have studied so far to an in-court settlement regime.
Suppose indeed that the legal system does not allow a plaintiff to drop a suit
outside court. Then, even a settlement necessitates to go, and pay, for trial. In an
(extreme) in-court settlement regime, the plaintiff pays Cp at the time she introduces
the lawsuit: she will use the court's and her lawyer's services even if she settles with
the defendant as this has to be agreed by the court. This will remove the credibility
constraint. The loss-averse plaintiff chooses S to maximize the following:
Up




[p (W −Cp)− (− 1)(1− p)Cp] f(p)dp (8)












Our assumptions on F () guarantees that we have a unique interior solution Sin 2 [Cd;
W +Cd). It is straightforward to show that Sin >Sfoc: Cp has been paid up-front so
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saving Cp is no longer an advantage associated to settlement, compared to trial. The
credibility constraint no longer plays a role because giving up trial means a sure loss
of Cp. Therefore, for intermediate values of W at which the credibility constraint
is binding in the out-of-court settlement regime, we may have Sin <S for the loss-
averse plaintiff.
For the lowest W that incentivizes a loss-averse plaintiff to sue (Win), we have
Win 6 W

. Intuitively, at W = W

in the in-court settlement system, the plaintiff
could bring the lawsuit and ask for S>W +Cd. This brings her the same utility as
in the out-of-court settlement regime. It is possible that she can do better because
the credibility constraint is no longer playing a role.
A special case is when Cd>Cp. The plaintiff can bring the lawsuit, pay Cp and
ask for S=Cd as long asW >0. The defendant will accept the offer whatever his type
is. We haveWin6W

in general andWin60 if Cd>Cp: under the in-court settlement
regime, the loss-averse plaintiff brings more small-claim lawsuits and sometime even
lawsuits with negative expected values. Cases with negative expected value become
profitable in the in-court settlement regime, provided the defendant's costs are high
enough. That is consistent with the results in Bebchuk (1996). The following figure
gives an illustration for Cd>Cp cases.
Figure 9. probabilities of trial and litigation costs under different settlement systems
(=2; Cp=4; Cd=2)
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Thus, the effect of requiring the plaintiff to settle in-court (at a cost) would have
an ambiguous effect on the volume of litigation: the net effect would again depend
on the distribution of claims.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our goal in this paper was to show how loss aversion theoretically affects people's
behavior in (civil) litigation, in particular with regards to settlements. We have
shown how loss aversion might lead to fewer suits for small claims, a lower settlement
probability for medium claims, and a higher settlement probability for large claims.
Due to loss aversion's effect on the plaintiff's credibility constraint, policies aiming at
reducing the number of costly trials and at fostering settlements may have different
effects for claims of different sizes. The only change in the modeled environment
which unambiguously leads to fewer trials across the board is the reduction in the
degree of information asymmetry about trial odds. Thus, rules and policies that
encourage access to informed legal advice or discovery at an early stage seem to be
the best way to foster settlements.14
In our analysis, we assumed that both litigants are risk-neutral. Risk aversion
and loss aversion are similar in one respect: the decision-maker puts extra weight
on the worst outcomes. Some of the results we have analyzed would materialize if
the parties to a dispute were risk-averse instead of loss-averse. There are differences,
however, due to the fact that risk aversion would affect the behavior of the defendant,
by making him more generally amenable to a settlement.
If we include the prospect theory insight that people are risk-averse in the gain
domain and risk-loving in the loss domain, then it will become more difficult for
the litigants to reach a settlement. For one, risk aversion makes it harder for the
plaintiff to commit to trial and will tighten the credibility constraint. Second, in the
loss domain, risk loving makes the defendant more willing to accept the gamble of
a trial and less willing to accept a settlement.
In any case, a more realistic specification of preferences in the presence of asym-
metric information can help explain why we observe fewer settlements, especially
for small claims, than the conventional model predicts.
14. Waldfogel (1998) and Huang (2009) provide some evidence to this effect.
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Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1
In the proper sub-game after the plaintiff makes offer S, if a defendant with type p
chooses r(S; p)< 1, then his expected payment is positive: (1− r)S. If he switches
to rejecting for sure, his expected payment is 0 since the plaintiff drops the suit with
probability 1 following rejection. Hence, all types should reject offer S. 
Proof. Lemma 2
In the proper sub-game after the plaintiff makes offer S, by assumption the defendant
expects the plaintiff to pursue the case with some positive probability if he rejects
the offer (dr(S)2 [0; 1)). The defendant will compare the outcome of accepting the
offer and that of rejecting it. For a defendant with type p, the expected utility from
rejecting the offer is (subscript d stands for defendant):
Ud
trial(p)=−(1− dr(S)) (pW +Cd)
The expected utility from accepting the offer is −S. As Udtrial(p) is decreasing in p,
Ud
trial(p~)>−S implies that Udtrial(p)>−S for p< p~ and Udtrial(p~)>−S~ for S~>S . 
Proof. Proposition 1 the existence and uniqueness of Sfoc






+(− 1) (1− p(Sfoc)) Cp
W
Define function H() as the following:
H(x)  (Cp+Cd)
W



























< 0 by assumption 1
It means that H(x) = 0 has at least one solution at [0; 1]. For the solution to be
unique, a sufficient condition is that the second-order derivative of function H()
has a constant sign over [0; 1]. Because the loss-aversion part −(− 1)x Cp
W
is linear
in x, the condition is met if and only if the second-order derivative of the reversed
hazard rate function 1−F (x)
f(x)
has a constant sign over [0; 1], which is our assumption
3. The uniqueness is established in the following manner:
Under the three assumptions 1) H(0)< 0; 2) 1−F (x)
f(x)
is decreasing in p on [0; 1];
and 3) the second-order derivative of 1−F (x)
f(x)
has a constant sign on [0; 1], the
function H(x) has three possible curvatures over [0; 1]: 1) monotonically increasing;
2) increasing in [0; x̂] and decreasing in (x̂; 1] where x̂ 2 [0; 1] and H 0(x̂) = 0; 3)
decreasing in [0; x~] and increasing in (x~; 1] where x~2 [0; 1] andH 0(x~)=0.
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In form 1), we can directly apply the intermediate value theorem on [0; 1].
With monotonicity, it is clear that a unique root exists. In form 2) we can apply
intermediate value theorem on [0; x̂] and in form 3) on [x~; 1]. With monotonicity,
a unique root is also guaranteed. The corresponding settlement offer S can be
recovered from the root p(S). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
The loss-averse plaintiff's trial stage utility is:
Up
trial(S)=E [pjp< p(S)]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E [pjp< p(S)])Cp
We have d Uptrial/d p(S)>0. And since d p(S)/d S>0, we have dUptrial/dS>0. This
means the maximum of Uptrial is achieved at p(S)=1 and S>W +Cd for any given
W . We use Uptrial to denote this maximum:
Up
trial=E[p]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E[p])Cp
We also have that d Uptrial/dW >0. By definition of W
, Uptrial=E[p]W
−Cp− (−
1) (1−E[p])Cp=0. So, for W <W

, Uptrial(S)< 0 for any S. Hence, the credibility
constraint cannot be met and the plaintiff will drop the suit for sure if a settlement
offer is rejected. By Lemma 1, all types of defendants reject the offer. Therefore, the
loss-averse plaintiff will not bring the lawsuit. A similar proof goes for the traditional





, a loss-averse plaintiff does not file a lawsuit
while a traditional plaintiff does for W 2 [Wtp;W ). This proves part 1.





Proof. The proof of this lemma directly follows the definition of the relevant set-
tlement offers. For S

and Stp, we have:
E[pjp< p(S

)]W −Cp = (− 1) (1−E[pjp< p(S

)])Cp (6)
E[pjp< p(Stp)]W −Cp = 0 (60)





(W ) and Stp(W ) are implicitly defined from the above equations. By the implicit
functions theorem, they are both continuous functions.
For Sfoc and Stp
foc, using p0(S)= 1/W , we have
1−F (p(Sfoc)) = f(p(Sfoc)) (Cp+Cd)/W
+(− 1) f(p(Sfoc)) (1− p(Sfoc))Cp/W (5)
1−F (p(Stpfoc)) = f(p(Stpfoc)) (Cp+Cd)/W (50)
Similarly, Sfoc(W ) and Stp
foc(W ) are implicitly defined from the above first-order
conditions (5) and (50) and they are thus continuous functions of W . To see that Sfoc
is smaller, we check what happens on the margin if the loss-averse plaintiff chooses
Stp
foc instead. The first-order derivative becomes:
Up
0(Stp
foc)=−(− 1) f(p(Stpfoc)) (1− p(Stpfoc))Cp/W < 0
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Therefore, Sfoc<Stp
foc. 
To continue with the proof, we define two more critical values of W . For the loss-
averse plaintiff, Wpe is defined as in Sfoc(Wpe ) = S

(Wpe ); for the traditional plaintiff,
Wtpf is defined in Stpfoc(Wtpf )=Stp(Wtpf ). Wpe (Wtpf ) is the lowest compensation at which
the constraint Uptrial(S)> 0 (Utptrial(S)> 0) is slack for the loss-averse (traditional)
plaintiff.
To see that Wpe is uniquely defined, we use the fact that for W >W

, we have:





, an equilibrium offer cannot be lower than W +Cd due to the credibility
constraint: we have p(S

) = 1 > p(Sfoc).15 For W !1; p(S

)! 0 and p(Sfoc)! 1.





(Wpe ). A similar proof goes for the traditional plaintiff. At W =Wtpf , we
have Stp
foc(Wtpf )=Stp(Wtpf ).
Lemma 4. At W =Wtpf , p(S)> p(Stp ) and S>Stp ; for W >Wtpf , Stp =Stpfoc. For
W 2 [Wtp;Wtpf ], the Utptrial(S)> 0 constraint is binding for the traditional plaintiff.
At W =Wpe , p(S)<p(Stp ) and S<Stp ; for W >Wpe , S=Sfoc. For W 2 [W ;Wpe ],theUptrial(S)> 0 constraint is binding for the loss-averse plaintiff.
Wtpf <Wpe .




foc>Sfoc. Therefore, S>Stp and p(S)> p(Stp ).
At W =W~p, S= S





foc. Therefore, S<Stp , and p(S)> p(Stp ).
Since Stp
foc>Stp at Wpe and Stpfoc=Stp at Wtpf , it means the credibility constraint
is binding at Wtpf but not binding at Wpe . We have Wtpf <Wpe . 
Directly from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 , for W

6 W < Wtpf , the credibility
constraint is binding for both plaintiffs. We have S = S





 ; for W > Wpe , neither is binding and we have S = Sfoc, Stp = Stpfoc,
Sfoc<Stp
foc=)S<Stp .
Now we show that in interval [Wtpf ; Wpe ], there exist W~ such that two plaintiffs
make the same settlement offer. By Lemma 4, forW 2 [Wtpf ;Wpe ], we have Stp =Stpfoc ,
S=S

and thus p(S)= p(S

) and p(Stp )= p(Stp
foc).
15. For W =W

, the plaintiff's expected utility from bringing the lawsuit and making a credible offer is
zero. She is indifferent between bringing it and not. For simplicity, we assume that she brings the lawsuit,
makes a credible offer and pursue the case to trial. We assume the same thing for traditional plaintiff for
W =Wtp.
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At W = Wtpf , p(Stp ) < p(S); at Wpe , p(Stp ) > p(S). By the implicit function
theorem, p(Stp ) and p(S) are continuous inW 2 [Wtpf ;Wpe ] and we have the following






From the intermediate value theorem, p(S) and p(Stp ) intersect at a unique point





foc. The loss-averse plaintiff's credibility constraint is binding while the traditional
plaintiff's is not. In sum, for W

6W <W~ , we have:
S>Stp
 ; p(S)> p(Stp
 ) if W

6W <W~
Total expected litigation costs are higher if the plaintiff is loss-averse because the
probability of trial is higher. For W >W~ , we have:
S<Stp
 ; p(S)< p(Stp
 )
Total litigation costs are smaller if the plaintiff is loss-averse.
End of proof Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.
1. W

is defined by: W

= (1 + ( − 1) (1 − E[p])) Cp
E[p]
. E[p] is higher under G
since G first-order stochastically dominates F . Thus, W

is lower under G.
2. p(S

) is the unique solution to E [pjp < p(S

)]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E[pjp <
p(S

)])Cp=0. Under G, E [pjp<h] is higher for any h> p

+ ". Since the LHS
is increasing in E [pjp < p(S

)] and E [pjp < p(S






) is needed for the equality to remain true.






: If p(Sfoc) increases by ", we have
1−G(p(Sfoc)+ ")
f(p(Sfoc)+ ")
> p0(Sfoc) (Cp+Cd)+ (−1) p0(Sfoc) (1− [p(Sfoc) +"])Cp
for  > 1: As the inverse hazard rate of F is assumed to be decreasing, the
expression can then only be met with equality with p(S)> p(Sfoc)+ ".
4. It follows from 2 and 3 that W~ decreases. End of Proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
1. W

is defined by: W

= (1+(− 1) (1−E[p])) Cp
E[p]






) is the unique solution to E [pjp< p(S

)]W −Cp− (− 1) (1−E [pjp<
p(S

)])Cp=0. Under G~ , E [pjp<h] is higher for any h>a+ ". Since the LHS
is increasing in E [pjp< p(S

)] and E [pjp< p(S






) for the equality to remain true.
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3. p(Sfoc) under G~ is given by 1−G
~(p(Sfoc))
g~(p(Sfoc))
= p0(Sfoc) (Cp + Cd) + ( −
1)p0(Sfoc)(1 − p(Sfoc)) Cp. Now, g~(p) = f(p) / [F (b 0) − F (a0)], G~(p) =
0 for p 2 [a; a0], and G~(p) = [F (p) − F (a0)] / [F (b 0) − F (a0)] for p 2 (a0;
b 0]. Thus, for a given p, the LHS is lower than in (4) while the RHS is
unchanged. As the RHS is decreasing in p(Sfoc), it calls for a decrease in
p(Sfoc) for the equality to be maintained. End of Proof.
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